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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this appeal by 
virtue of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 2 6 of the 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure (See Appendix A) ; and 78-2a-
3(2) (d) , Utah Code Annotated, 1953, (as amended) . See Appendix A. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
The following is a list of those constitutional provisions, 
statutes and rules thought to be determinative. A complete text of 
each provision is found in Appendix A. 
Section 76-6-602(1), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. 
Section 76-6-603, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. 
Section 78-2a-3(2)(d), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. 
FACTS 
The defendant in this matter was tried by the bench and 
convicted of retail theft on March 10, 1992. Defendants conviction 
stemmed from an incident where the defendant took two video 
cassette tapes in a single package from the K-mart store located at 
475 North State Street in Orem. 
At the trial, the City of Orem was represented by Donald E. 
McCandless, and the defendant was represented by Randy Lish. The 
City first called Wendy Callahan, the Loss Prevention Manager for 
the K-Mart store in Orem. Ms. Callahan testified to the following: 
Ms. Callahan first observed the defendant on December 23, 1992, 
from an observation window above the appliance and tape section of 
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statement was illegible, though it appeared to say "put tapes in 
bag." At that point, Mr. Lee stood up and stated, "you told me I 
could go if I did this." Ms. Callahan said "No I did not." "We 
need to do this and then we'll talk." Mr. Lee then grabbed his 
statement from across the table and crinkled it up. Police 
officers were called. During cross examination Ms. Callahan 
testified that it would be impossible to determine whether a 
particular tape had been stolen from an inventory list. R. at 19. 
On Cross examination Mr. Lee admitted that he placed the tapes in 
the sack. R. at 28. Ms. Callahan testified that based on her 
experience, if she were going to attempt to shoplift, she would do 
it the same way Mr. Lee has been convicted of doing. She indicates 
that the technique is called "buy one get one free." Shoplifters 
using this technique are difficult to apprehend because there is 
luck involved in seeing a person come into a section with nothing, 
seeing them select an item and identifying that item, and watching 
them take the item into their possession. R. at 10-11. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Appellee City of Orem asserts that Judge Dimick properly found 
the defendant guilty in this matter. Every element of retail theft 
was proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Defendant erroneously asserts that to prove the elements of 
retail theft the City must prove that a specific item is missing 
from inventory. Such evidence is neither available nor necessary. 
The evidence at trial was that K-Mart does not have the capability 
to determine whether a particular item is missing. In the case at 
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to the trier of fact to support the verdict. After considering 
what evidence has been marshalled, the appellate court must: 
view all the evidence and inferences that may reasonably 
be drawn from it in a light most favorable to the jury 
verdict, and [the] verdict will be reversed only if 
evidence is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently 
improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a 
reasonable doubt that defendant committed the crime of 
which he was convicted, State v. Caver, 814 P.2d 604, 
612 (Utah App. 1991). 
As indicated in appellant's brief this standard has been widely 
applied. State v. Perdue, 813 P.2d 1201 (Utah App. 1991); State v. 
Moore, 802 P.2d 732 (Utah App. 1990); State v. Pederson, 802 P.2d 
1328, 1330 (Utah App. 1990); State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141, 1147 
(Utah 1989); State v. Bolsinqer, 699 P.2d 1214, 1218 (Utah 1985). 
State v. Moosman, 794 P.2d 474-476, (Utah 1990) . 
B. The evidence presented at trial by Appellee clearly 
establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 
The marshalling requirement set forth above necessitates 
appellant setting forth the evidence in favor of the verdict. 
Appellant has failed to do that, and has left the court in much the 
same position as described in State v. Scheel, 823 P.2d 470-473 
(Utah App. 1991) . 
Defendant's brief is devoid of any mention of the 
evidence supporting the jury verdict. Rather, it 
attempts to reargue defendant's case by recounting a 
version of the facts most favorable to defendant while 
ignoring lengthy expert testimony concerning the origin 
of the fire and explaining why defendant's story is not 
feasible,. Thus while "emphasizing the evidence that 
supported his position," defendant has "left it to the 
court to sort out what evidence actually supported the 
findings." Quoting Heineke v. Dept of Commerce 810 P.2d 
459, 464 (Utah App. 1991). 
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Appellant appears to have left out of his marshalling of the 
evidence references to critical facts which support the verdict. 
1. Mr. Lee was first observed in the blank tape aisle 
from an observation window. He was wearing a coat and had 
nothing in his hands. R. at 3. 
2. Mr. Lee went directly to the camcorder tapes and 
selected a package containing two tapes. R. at 3. 
3. Mr. Lee left the tape aisle and traveled down the 
first home improvement aisle still carrying the tapes. He 
entered the next home improvement aisle carrying the tapes, 
then stopped momentarily while selecting a caulking gun from 
the bottom shelf. When Mr. Lee left that aisle he was 
carrying the caulking gun, and the tapes which had apparently 
been placed inside a crinkled K-Mart bag. R. at 4. 
4. Mr. Lee did not have the bag in his hands when he 
entered that aisle. The bag into which the tapes were placed 
was not new. R. at 4. Mr. Lee admitted that he brought the 
bag into the store with him, and that he put tapes into a bag. 
R. at 24 and 28. Also at 22. 
5. Mr. Lee testified that he was in the store to return 
tapes. R. at 22, 24, 25. Despite his claim that he was in 
the store to return tapes, he was observed in the tape aisle 
where he selected a package of tapes which were in his 
possession when he left the aisle. R. at 3 and 4. 
6. Store security searched the areas of the store where 
Mr. Lee had been seen and did not find any other tapes. R. at 
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17. 
7. Mr. Lee went to the front of the store where he paid 
for the caulking gun., He was stopped shortly thereafter. R. 
at 5 . 
8. After being stopped, Mr. Lee produced a receipt from 
the previous day which had 8mm tapes on it. R. at 5. 
9. After showing the receipt, Mr. Lee became agitated. 
Store security had to call for help to prevent him from 
leaving the store. Mr. Lee kept shoving at the security 
officer while trying to leave. R. at 5-6. 
10. In the security office Mr. Lee wrote a statement 
which appeared to say "put tapes in bag" then crinkled the 
statement. R. at 19. 
11. Ms. Callahan testified that based on her experience 
as a loss pretention manager, if she were going to shoplift 
she would do it the same way Mr. Lee has been convicted of 
doing. She testified that the technique is called buy one get 
one free. Shoplifters using this technique* are difficult to 
apprehend because luck is involved in seeing a person come 
into a section with nothing, watching them select an item, 
identifying the item and watching them take the item into 
their possession. R. at 10-11. 
There is more than an adequate factual basis set forth in the 
facts marshalled above to support the verdict of Judge Dimick 
convicting the defendant. The elements of this crime are set forth 
in Utah Code Annotated section 76-6-602(1) (1953, as amended) . The 
7 
elements are set forth as follows: 
A person commits the offense of retail theft when he 
knowingly: (1) Takes possession of, conceals, carries 
away, transfers or causes to be carried away or 
transferred, any merchandise displayed, held, stored or 
offered for sale in a retail mercantile establishment 
with the intention of retaining such merchandise or with 
the intention of depriving the merchant permanently of 
the possession, use or benefit of such merchandise 
without paying the retail value of such merchandise. 
The evidence clearly establishes that Mr. Lee took possession of 
merchandise belonging to K-Mart, that he concealed the merchandise, 
that he attempted to carry it away, and that he did so without 
paying the retail value of the merchandise. His intent in this 
matter can clearly be inferred from his actions. 
C. It is not necessary to prove that the tapes in question 
were missing from inventory. 
Appellant argues for an impossible requirement in requesting 
that Appellee produce inventory lists showing that a particular 
item is missing from inventory. The evidence at trial was that it 
is impossible to determine from inventory lists whether a 
particular item has been stolen. R. at 19. Appellant's argument 
in reality goes to the sufficiency of the evidence, and the 
credibility of witnesses. Evidence was presented that Mr. Lee was 
seen picking up the tapes in question from the tape aisle in K-
Mart. R. at 3. Mr. Lee testified that he did not take the tapes 
from the shelf. R. at 26. It is clear that the Court has chosen to 
believe Ms. Callahan's testimony rather than that of Mr. Lee. 
There is adequate evidence in the record for the court to find that 
the tapes were taken from K-Mart. 
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II. NO INTERPRETER WAS NECESSARY BECAUSE APPELLANT HAS AN ADEQUATE 
UNDERSTANDING OF ENGLISH. 
The claimed need for an interpreter in this matter has first 
been raised on appeal. Appellant attempts to remedy that 
deficiency by claiming that trial counsel was incompetent. The 
part of this claim that deals with competency of counsel will be 
dealt with later in this brief. 
The issue of an interpreter was not dealt with at the time of 
trial because neither of the parties, nor the court perceived any 
need for an interpreter. The defendant in this matter has lived in 
the United States for an extended period of time. He works as an 
engineer, and is studying for a doctorate. Both at work, and in 
school, the defendant functions using the English language. The 
defendant certainly has an accent, but at the time of trial neither 
the court nor the attorneys had any difficulty communicating with 
the defendant. The answers defendant made to counsel were 
responsive, and though his English is somewhat broken, it is clear 
from the record that neither the court nor counsel had difficulty 
understanding the defendant, his testimony, or his theory of the 
case. Admittedly there are a few places in the record where the 
reporter had a difficult time understanding the defendant, and 
marked the record "unintelligible." These areas have two sources. 
The first of these comes from the difficulties which naturally 
arise when a record must be made from a tape recording by a person 
who was not present at trial. The second source of difficulty 
arises because Mr. Lee appeared to have breathing difficulties at 
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trial which caused him to cough and wheeze a number of times. The 
fact that these problems made a less than perfect record does not 
automatically mean that the defendant did not understand the judge, 
and the judge the defendant. Review of the record makes it clear 
from the context of the conversations that the parties had little 
trouble communicating. It is incredible to assume that a Judge 
would convict the defendant without being able to understand his 
testimony. 
The Court of Appeals in the State of Washington dealt with a 
situation similar to the case at bar in State v. Mendez 784 P.2d 
168 (Wash. App. 1989) . In that case the court was considering 
whether to allow a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea. One of the 
issues on appeal was whether the defendant had an adequate 
understanding of English to allow him to enter his plea knowingly. 
Like the defendant in the case at bar, Mr. Mendez had lived in the 
United States for an extended period of time, and had an 
understanding of the English language. In that case it was 
apparent from the record that the defendant had an adequate 
understanding of the English language to allow him to understand 
the nature of his actions in court. The Court stated: 
We see nothing, however, in either the rule or the 
statute that imposes on the trial court the affirmative 
obligation to appoint an interpreter for a defendant 
where that defendant's lack of fluency or facility in the 
language is not apparent. The appointment of an 
interpreter is within the discretion of the trial court 
and will not be disturbed on appeal absent a showing of 
abuse. 
There can be no showing of abuse of discretion in the case at bar 
because it was not apparent to either counsel, or the Court that 
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Mr. Lee did not have an adequate understanding of English. 
Further, Mr. Lee has not shown that the lack of an interpreter has 
hampered the presentation of his case. Despite any language 
difficulties he may have had at trial, Mr. Lee's case was 
presented, and he took the stand and testified. At no time did a 
difficulty with language impede the trial or prevent Mr. Lee from 
presenting his theory of the case. This Court has stated, "Failure 
to appoint an interpreter, however, is reversible error only when 
the record shows that the defendant's presentation of the case has 
been thereby hampered." State v. Drobel 815 P.2d 724, 737 (Utah 
App. 1991), State v. Vasguez, 121 P.-2d 903, 906 (1942). 
III. DEFENDANT WAS ADEQUATELY REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL 
Mr. Lee's contentions with regard to counsel are essentially 
twofold. The first argument seems to indicate that Mr. Lee was not 
adequately represented because he did not have an interpreter 
appointed, and none was appointed by the Court. This argument is 
simply another attempt to have this court consider the interpreter 
issue which has been discussed previously. No interpreter was 
necessary because the defendant speaks and understands the English 
language. 
The second contention seems to be that Mr. Lee's trial counsel 
was incompetent because of the trial strategy he adopted. 
Defendant's brief sets forth the proper standard for considering a 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, which is the standard 
set forth in Strickland v. Washington 466 U.S. 668,687, Reh'h 
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denied, 467 U.S. 1267 (1984). This case sets forth a two pronged 
test. The first prong essentially is showing that trial counsel's 
performance was deficient by showing errors so serious that counsel 
was not functioning as counsel. The second prong requires that the 
defendant show that the deficient performance prejudiced the 
defendant. This requires a showing that the claimed errors of 
counsel were so serious as to deprive defendant of a fair trial. 
Mr. Lee has not met either prong of the test. 
The first issue raised by Defendant is that there was no 
challenge to the detention of Mr. Lee by store personnel. The 
reason there was no challenge to this detention is that there was 
nothing improper about the way the detention was handled. Mr. Lish 
had conducted discovery and knew this. Mr. Lee was extremely 
agitated at the time he was detained by store personnel, and only 
the necessary force to control the situation was used. R. at 6, 14, 
15. Utah's retail theft provisions allow detention of persons such 
as Mr. Lee. Utah Code Annotated 76-6-603 (1953 as amended). Mr. 
Lee while trying to intimate that there might be something improper 
about his detention, has failed to provide the court with any 
information that there actually was a problem with either the 
length or manner of his detention. Defendant seems to lean heavily 
on the fact that he was asked to prepare a written statement while 
he was detained. This statement was not offered into evidence by 
the City. The only part of the statement which was used was 
testimony that store personnel thought the statement said "put 
tapes in bag." This statement is not harmful as it fits 
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defendant's theory of the case perfectly, as it is his contention 
that he had a package of tapes which belonged to him, and he put 
them in a bag to avoid problems with personnel at the store 
thinking he had stolen them. 
On appeal Mr,. Lee contends that representation by counsel was 
inadequate because no objection was made on the basis of foundation 
to introduction of the tapes. The tapes were offered into evidence 
during cross examination of the first witness as a matter of 
convenience. The problem with Mr. Lee's position on appeal is that 
there would be no reason to object to the introduction of the 
tapes. Mr. Lee's theory of the case was that these were his tapes 
which he purchased the day before. Introduction of the tapes into 
evidence is as critical to the presentation of Mr. Lee's case as it 
was for the City. Allowing the tapes into evidence with minimal 
foundation was certainly not proof that counsel was not acting 
properly. Defendant needed the tapes admitted to help test his 
theory of the case. 
The same argument holds true with regard to the statement "put 
tapes in bag." Defendant's theory was that he was putting the 
tapes he had previously purchased in his bag. There was likely not 
an objection available which could have prevented the statement 
from coming into evidence even if there had been a reason for 
counsel to object to it. 
Mr. Lee contends that critical evidence was not offered which 
would provide a defense to Mr. Lee. The item specifically referred 
to was the receipt which showed that defendant purchased some tapes 
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the day prior. While it is true that the actual receipt was not 
offered, there was extensive testimony regarding the receipt and 
its contents, to which there was no objection. It was unrefuted at 
trial that Mr. Lee produced a receipt from the day before the crime 
which showed he had purchased tapes. Offering the actual receipt 
at trial would not add any additional weight to that unrefuted 
testimony. There was therefore no error by counsel. The fact that 
Defendant had the receipt was not disputed, but was basically 
stipulated to. 
As has been demonstrated, the errors Mr. Lee claims were made 
by counsel at trial were in fact part of Mr. Lish's trial strategy, 
and cannot be construed as ineffectiveness by counsel. 
Furthermore, Mr. Lee has not shown how the alleged acts or 
omissions of counsel have prejudiced his defense. See State v. 
Montes, 804 P.2d 543, 546 (Utah App. 1991). Without such showing, 
a claim of ineffective counsel cannot stand. This court in State 
v. Montes with respect to Mr. Montes claim that his counsel's 
performance was deficient stated "Montes can only prevail if he 
demonstrates that he was prejudiced as a result of that deficient 
performance. The mere fact that Montes received an unfavorable 
result does not give rise to the conclusion that his trial counsel 
was deficient." State v. Montes, 804 P.2d 543, 546,547 (Utah App. 
1991), State v. Grueber, 776 P.2d 70, 76 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
Because there are tactical and strategic justifications for 
Counsel's actions in this case, the claim of ineffectiveness of 
counsel cannot stand. 
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Generally, an attorney's performance will be held 
ineffective only when there is no tactical, or strategic 
justification for his conduct of the trial. Thus, when 
counsel has failed to take a particular action, a court 
must determine whether such failure was justified by 
tactical or other considerations. State v. Colona, 766 
P.2d 1062, 1066 (Utah 1988). State v. Buel, 700 P.2d 
701, 703 (Utah 1985); Codianna v. Morris, 660 P.2d at 
1109. 
CONCLUSION 
Review of the evidence as marshalled by the Appellee City of 
Orem clearly provides sufficient facts to have allowed the Court to 
find beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Lee is guilty of retail 
theft. 
Mr. Lee's claim that he was denied a fair trial because he was 
not provided an interpreter is not well taken because he speaks and 
understands English, and because the issue has never been raised 
prior to the appeal. 
The claim that counsel was incompetent is based on 
inconsequential matters, and items that are part of the strategy 
used by counsel at trial. Because Mr. Lee has not demonstrated any 
reasons for reversal and remand, his conviction for retail theft 
should stand. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this Z ^ V ^ day of August, 1992. 
7 . 
Donald E. McCan^l^/ss 
Attorney for Appellee 
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APPENDIX A 
Utah Code Annotated 
(in applicable parts) 
Section 76-6-602(1) 
A person commits the offense of retail theft when he 
knowingly: 
Takes possession of, conceals, carries away, or transfers or 
causes to be carried away or transferred, any merchandise 
displayed, held, stored, or offered for sale in a retail 
mercantile establishment with the intention of retaining such 
merchandise or with the intention of depriving the merchant 
permanently of the possession, use or benefit of such 
merchandise without paying the retail value of such 
merchandise. 
Section 76-6-603 
Any merchant who has probable cause to believe that a person 
has committed retail theft may detain such person, on or off the 
premises of a retail mercantile establishment, in a reasonable 
manner and for a reasonable length of time for all or any of the 
following purposes: 
(1) To make reasonable inquiry as to whether such person has 
in his possession unpurchased merchandise and to make 
reasonable investigation of the ownership of such merchandise; 
(2) To request identification; 
(3) To verify such identification; 
(4) To make a reasonable request of such person to place or 
keep in full view any merchandise such individual may have 
removed, or which the merchant has reason to believe he may 
have removed, from its place of display or elsewhere, whether 
for examination, purchase or for any other reasonable purpose; 
(5) To inform a peace officer of the detention of the person 
and surrender that person to the custody of a peace officer; 
(6) In the case of a minor, to inform a peace officer, the 
parents, guardian or other private person interested in the 
welfare of that minor immediately, if possible, of this 
detention and to surrender custody of such minor to such 
person. 
A merchant may make a detention as permitted herein off the 
premises of a retail mercantile establishment only if such 
detention is pursuant to an immediate pursuit of such person. 
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UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
(in applicable parts) 
Section 78-2a-3(2)(d) 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, 
including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over: 
(d) appeals from the circuit courts, except those from 
the small claims department of a circuit court; 
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